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Abstract 
This paper provides an empirical analysis of decoupling economic growth and energy use and 
its various determinants by exploring trends in energy- and labour productivity across 10 
manufacturing sectors and 14 OECD countries for the period 1970-1997. We explicitly aim 
to trace back aggregate developments in the manufacturing sector to developments at the 
level of individual subsectors. A cross-country decomposition analysis reveals that in some 
countries structural changes contributed considerably to aggregate manufacturing energy-
productivity growth and, hence, to d coupling, while in other countries they partly offset 
energy-efficiency improvements. In contrast, structural changes only play a minor role in 
explaining aggregate manufacturing labour-productivity developments. Furthermore, we find 
labour-productivity growth to be higher on average than energy-productivity growth. Over 
time, this bias towards labour-productivity growth is increasing in the aggregate 
manufacturing sector, while it is decreasing in most manufacturing subsectors. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Energy is an essential production factor that fuels economic growth and serves human well-
being. Along with unprecedented economic growth, world primary energy use has grown 
enormously since the middle of the 19th c ntury. The energy crisis of the 1970s and, more 
recently, the environmental problems associated with economic growth and increasing energy 
use have made most governments in OECD countries to strive explicitly for sustainable 
development, aiming to decouple economic growth and environmental pressure. In a more 
operational sense this implies a need for a simultaneous productivity increase of ‘traditional’ 
input factors, such as labour and capital, and of ‘environmental’ input factors, such as 
materials and energy.  
 Over the last decades, a growth accounting tradition has emerged measuring the 
contribution of various determinants to output- and roductivity growth (see, for example, 
Kendrick 1961; Denison 1967; Jorgenson and Griliches 1967; Maddison 1991; Jorgenson 
1995; Wagner and van Ark 1996; van Ark 1997; Barro 1997). This empirical research on 
productivity growth has focused almost exclusively on labour-, capital- and total factor-
productivity growth. Among the main empirical findings are that economic growth depends 
on a number of interrelated factors such as an increase in the labour force and labour 
productivity, accumulation of knowledge and capital, institutional factors and – probably 
most importantly – technological change (see, for example, OECD 2003). More recently, this 
work has been accompanied by empirical research on energy-pr ductivity or energy-intensity 
developments and its determinants (see, for example, Jorgenson 1984, 1986; Howarth et al. 
1991; Schipper and Meyers 1992; Rosenberg 1994; Miketa 2001). Although this literature is 
rather diverse in focus, broad consensus exists that both technological change and changes in 
the production structure are among the most important determinants of long-run increases of 
energy productivity. In this paper we build upon both perspectives in the literature by 
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simultaneously analyzing energy- and labour-productivity developments across 10 
Manufacturing sectors and 14 OECD countries, for the period 1970-1997. In doing so, we put 
emphasis on an examination of the role of technological change in driving productivity 
growth of the two production factors energy and labour. Hence, we are able to explore to 
what extent technology-driven improvements of energy- and labour productivity performance 
contribute to a decoupling of economic growth and environmental pressure at a detailed 
sectoral level across the most important OECD countries. 
 For this aim, we constructed a new database to establish a link between economic and 
energy data at a detailed sectoral level for a range of cou tries. A brief description of this 
dataset is given in Section 2. The level of sectoral detail in our dataset allows us to trace back 
aggregate manufacturing energy- and labour-productivity trends to developments at the level 
of individual sectors. In Section 3 we document several stylised facts on the levels and trends 
in manufacturing energy- and labour-productivity performance, examining the role of the 
different manufacturing subsectors. As noted previously, observed aggregate productivity 
trends are not directly attributable to technological change in individual sectors, but also the 
result of changes in the production structure, i.e., of changes in the distribution of production 
factors among different sectors. The underlying reason is that some ectors produce more 
value added per unit of input (energy or labour) than others, because some activities require 
more capital, higher labour skills and/or technology than others. Our data show that across 
OECD countries, the manufacturing sector is cha acterised by a very heterogeneous 
production structure. H nce, understanding technology-driven productivity performance 
requires an assessment of productivity developments in individual sectors (see also, for 
example, Dollar and Wolff 1993; Wagner and van Ark 1996; Jorgenson 1984). In Section 4 
we therefore decompose per country the aggregate manufacturing energy- and labour 
productivity growth into a part due to shifts in the underlying sectoral structure and into a part 
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caused by technology-driven efficiency improvements in individual sectors. In several 
respects, our decomposition differs from other decomposition studies (e.g., van Ark 1996; 
Unander et al. 1999), most notably by the combination of a relatively high level of sectoral 
detail with a wide range of countries, a simultaneous exploration of p oductivity performance 
along the two dimensions of energy and labour, and a detailed calculation per country of the 
percentage contribution of each manufacturing sector to structural changes and efficiency 
improvements at the level of aggregate manufacturing.  
 Finally, by documenting the relation between energy- and labour-productivity growth 
rates we touch upon the issue of the direction of technological change. The idea that the 
nature of technological progress might be factor-augmenting, depending on relative factor 
prices and substitution possibilities, goes back to Hicks (1932) and received attention in the 
theoretical and empirical literature on technological change and factor-productivity 
developments ever since (see, for example, Kennedy 1962; Binswanger 1974a,b; Acemoglu 
2002; Ruttan 2001). Recently, the issue has also been addressed in the context of 
environmental policy and energy use, examining a price- or product-s andard induced bias 
towards enrgy-saving technological change (see, for example, Newell et al. 1999; Smulders 
and de Nooij 2003; Taheri and Stevenson 2002). An important hypothesis in this respect is 
that if all technological efforts are directed towards an increase in labour productivity, energy 
productivity improvements might slow down because of lack of resources devoted to 
increasing energy efficiency - and vice versa. In Section 5 we provide some empirical 
evidence on the existence and development of a potential bias towards either energy- or
labour productivity improvements, which might reflect biases of technological change at the 
level of individual sectors. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Data 
The analysis presented in this paper is based on a newly constructed database that merges 
energy data from the Energy Balances, as they are published by the International Energy 
Agency (IEA), and economic data from the International Sectoral Database (ISDB) and the 
Structural Analysis Database (STAN), both published by the OECD. The main idea behind 
the construction of this database is to establish a link between economic and energy data at a 
detailed sectoral level. This results in the sector classification as described in Table 1. 
 
< Insert Table 1 around here > 
 
The database covers the period 1970-1997 and includes the following countries: Australia 
(AUS), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Denmark (DNK), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), 
West-Germany (WGR), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), the Netherlands (NLD), Norway (NOR), 
Sweden (SWE), United Kingdom (GBR) and the United States (USA). 
 We measure energy productivity by gross value added per unit of final energy 
consumption and labour productivity by gross value added per worker (in full time 
equivalents). Value added is the net economic output of a sector, measured by th  price 
differential between the price of output and the cost of input and comprises compensation to 
employees, operating surplus, the consumption of fixed capital and the excess of indirect 
taxes over subsidies (OECD 1998). Following the IEA, en rgy use is defined as final energy 
consumption in kilo tonnes of oil equivalence (ktoe),2 with sectoral data excluding 
transformation losses. Total employment is measured in the full-time equivalent number of 
persons, including self-employed.  
                                         
2 Hence, we do not analyse explicitly the impact of changes in fuel mix on overall energy-effici ncy 
improvements. 
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 The value-added data have been converted to constant 1990 US$, using 1990 
expenditure purchasing power parities (PPP) as given by the OECD. In principle the 
theoretically most appropriate conversion factors for productivity comparisons at the sectoral 
level are to be based on a comparison of output prices by industry of origin, rather than on 
expenditure prices (e.g., van Ark and Pilat 1993).3 The main problem in using the production 
or industry-of-origin approach, however, is the limited availability of producer-price based 
PPPs, in particular for non-Ma ufacturing sectors (van Ark 1993).4 Hence, most studies 
including cross-country productivity comparisons use expenditure PPPs. Moreover, for an 
international comparison the main issue is whether there are substantial cro s-country 
differences with respect to the drawbacks of expenditure PPPs as outlined above. We have no 
a priori reason to presume that these cross-country differences are substantial. Therefore, in 
this study we use expenditure PPPs, enabling a systematic cross-country analysis of energy- 
and labour-productivity performance at a high level of sectoral detail. Obviously, because of 
these issues, the results reported in this paper should be interpreted with caution. 
 In general, it holds for each analysis of productivity developments that he lower the 
level of aggregation the better, but that an adequate distinction between factor-intensiv  and 
factor-extensive sectors is even more important. In this respect, it is to be noted that ur 
Chemicals sector is defined at a rather aggregated level. Chemicals is built up from the 
energy-intensive sub-sector Industrial Chemicals (ISIC 351, including basic industrial 
chemicals, fertilizers, pesticides and main plastic products) and the energy-ext sive sub-
sector Other Chemical Products (ISIC 352, including paints, drugs and medicines, cosmetics 
                                         
3 The drawbacks of expenditure PPPs are: (i) they exclude the part of output that is exported, while they include 
imported goods produced elsewhere; (ii) they take account of differences in trade and transport margins and 
indirect taxes between countries; and (iii) they do not cover intermediate products. 
4 This limited availability is due to some problems inherent to the industry-of-origin approach: producer prices 
(i.e., production values divided by output quantities) may not properly account for cross-country quality 
differences and imply aggregation problems for they are available only for a sample of goods (partly because of 
confidentiality problems), and because the production structure among countries tends to be less comparable 
than the consumption structure due to specialization tendencies in production according to comparative 
advantage (Pilat 1996). 
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and cleaning products). Until consistent and internationally comparable energy and economic 
data become available for a more detailed breakdown of the chemical sector, this problem 
will persist and energy-productivity figures for the sector Chemicals should be interpreted 
with caution.  
 Finally, for the USA the IEA Energy Balances unfortunately provide no sectoral 
breakdown for the consumption of oil products and natural gas within Manufacturing until 
1995. Instead, these volumes are included in the sector Non-Sp ified I dustry (NSI) and, 
hence, they are available only at the level of the aggregate Manufacturing sector. For this 
reason, for the different USA Manufacturing sub-sectors, we neither include data from 1995 
onwards nor do we report levelsof energy consumption. We do, however, calculate energy-
productivity growth rates for the different USA Manufacturing sub-sectors, with final energy 
consumption defined as the sum of only Coal and Electricity consumption, under the 
assumption that the share of the sum of oil and gas in final energy consumption is more or 
less constant over time. Hence, the documented growth rates of energy productivity for the 
breakdown of the USA Manufacturing sector should be interpreted with caution. 
 
3. Stylized Facts  
Economic development typically involves a change in the sectoral composition of economies, 
with the industrialisation process inducing a shift from the Agricultural sector towards
Industry, followed by a deindustrialisation phase increasing the importance of the Service 
sector (e.g., Baumol 1967; Maddison 1991, 1999; de Groot 2000). Moreover, in the OECD 
countries the Transport sector tends to overtake the Manufacturing sector as the largest 
consumer of final energy (Schipper and Meyers 1992). Nevertheless, within th  OECD the 
Manufacturing sector is still responsible for about 40% of total final energy consumption and 
25% of total employment (UN 2001). We start our analysis by presenting seve al stylised 
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facts on the aforementioned issues, in order to illustrate the possible implications for 
decoupling economic growth and energy use. For this aim we plot in Figure 1 for each 
country in our dataset the development over time of the levels of GDP, final energy 
consumption and total employment in the aggregate manufacturing sector (normalised at 100 
in the initial year of the sample).  
 
< Insert Figure 1 around here > 
 
From the figure it can be seen that in all countries manufacturing val e added has increased 
while in virtually all countries total manufacturing employment has been declining. 
Concerning energy consumption the picture is diverse: in Denmark, the United Kingdom and 
the USA it has been falling, in Australia, Canada, Finlan nd Japan it has increased, while in 
all the other countries the level of final energy use has been more or less constant over time. 
Moreover, except for Norway, even in those countries showing increasing total 
manufacturing energy use, the growth in energy consumption has been outpaced by growth in 
value added, implying an increase in manufacturing energy productivity. In other words, 
while delinking of economic growth and energy use in the manufacturing sector is absolute 
(‘strong decoupling’) in Denmark, the United Kingdom and the USA, most countries show a 
pattern of relative delinking (‘weak’ decoupling).  
  To compare the development of manufacturing energy- and labour-productivity 
performance across the different countries, we show in Figure 2 and 3 th aggregate 
manufacturing energy- and labour-productivity levels over time, for each of the 14 OECD 
countries in our dataset. Figure 2 shows that in aggregate manufacturing two groups of 
countries can be identified in terms of observed levels of energy productivity. Denmark, Italy, 
West-Germany, France, Japan and the United Kingdom show a high level of energy 
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productivity while the USA, Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Australia, Finland, Canada and 
Norway display a relative low energy-productivity level.5 Figure 3, confirms again the well-
known leading position of the USA in terms of labour productivity. It also shows that there is 
no clear pattern of catching-up by other OECD countries. 
 
< Insert Figures 2 and 3 around here > 
 
As previously noted, aggregate trends prevent a good understanding of sectoral dynamics, in 
particular in case of a high degree of sectoral heterogeneity. Henc , we continue by 
examining the role of the 10 manufacturing sub-sector  (see Table 1) in driving these 
aggregate developments. To illustrate the structure of the manufacturing sector, we first give 
a brief overview of their shares in Manufacturing energy consumption, employment and GDP 
(see Figure 4). For the 14 OECD countries included in this study taken together, the sub-
sector Chemicals consumed by far most energy with a share of 40% in Manufacturing final 
energy consumption in 1990, followed by Iron and Steel (16%), Paper, Pulp and Printing 
(11%) and Non-Metallic Minerals (9%).6 
 
< Insert Figure 4 around here > 
 
In Figure 4 we compare those shares with the shares of total employment and value added.7 
This yields a different picture, with Machinery accounting for the largest share of 
                                         
5 For the same sample of countries but using energy consumption data from partly different sources, Unander et 
al. (1999) distinguish 3 groups of countries for Manufacturing energy-intensity, which differ slightly from our 
picture by classifying the Netherlands, Sweden and the USA in a medium-group. 
6 These percentages are in line with IEA data of total OECD in 1997: Chemicals: 39%; Iron and Steel: 11%; 
Paper: 10%; Non-Metallic Minerals: 9%. 
7 Note that Manufacturing sector shares of value added are calculated for the sum of 12 OECD countries 
(excluding Australia and Canada due to lack of data). 
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manufacturing total employment and value added (35-37%) followed by Food and Transport 
Equipment (each around 12%). These sectoral shares, however, differ substantially among 
the different OECD countries under consideration. For example, in the Netherlands, the 
energy-intensive Chemical sector is responsible for 67% of manufacturing energy 
consumption, while in the other countries this share lies between 14% and 38%. In Finland 
and Sweden, Paper consumes around 40% of manufacturing energy consumption, while in 
the other countries this share lies in between 3% and 14%. Contrary to other countries, in 
Italy Textiles is responsible for a large share of total employment and value added.8 In other 
words, the manufacturing sector is characterised by a substantial degree of heterogen ity 
concerning the underlying production structure, which underlines the releva ce of taking a 
sectoral approach in examining its development of productivity over time. 
 Next, in order to see which Manufacturing sectors drive the observed aggregate trends, 
we provide in Table 2 for all 10 Manufacturing sub-sectors a cross-country comparison of the 
energy- and labour productivity level relative to the weighted OECD average in 1976, 1982, 
1990 and 1997.9  The table reveals that the energy-productivity level in Germany and Japan 
lies above the OECD average in most Manufacturing sectors, whil  he opposite is true for a 
country like Norway. Concerning labour productivity, Table 2 again confirms the well-
known leading position of the USA for most manufacturing sectors. Exceptions, however, are 
Non-Ferrous Metals and Non-Metallic Minerals, where the USA is lagging behind some 
other countries. For most countries, however, the table shows a diverse picture with 
considerable cross-sector variation in relative productivity performance. For example, the 
high energy-productivity level in Denmark, as shown in Figure 2, is due to an extremely high 
energy-productivity level in Chemicals and Paper, while its energy-productivity level in Food 
                                         
8 For a detailed overview of Manufacturing sector shares per country, we refer to Table A.1 in Appendix A. 
9 Note that we do not take the USA as the reference country because the USA lacks a sectoral breakdown of oil 
and natural consumption at this level of disaggregation (see Section 2). 
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is relatively low. The Netherlands are characterised by a relatively low level of energy 
productivity in Chemicals, but a relatively high energy-productivity level in Paper and Wood. 
Moreover, it shows a high labour-pr ductivity level in Non-Ferrous Metals, while the 
converse holds for Transport Equipment. A few other remarkable facts are: Finland, Norway 
and Sweden have low levels of energy productivity in Paper and Wood; the United Kingdom 
has a relatively high level of energy productivity in Chemicals, Iron and Steel and Paper, 
while this is relatively low in Machinery; and Italy has a very high level of energy 
productivity in Wood.  
 
< Insert Table 2 around here > 
 
Looking at the standard deviation of the log of relative energy productivity in Table 2 leads to 
the conclusion that the cross-country differences in energy productivity are substantially 
larger than cross-country differences in labour productivity. Moreover, we find cross-cou try 
differences in labour-productivity performance to be slightly decreasing. Cross-country 
dispersion of energy productivity is increasing in the energy-int nsive sectors Chemicals, 
Iron and Steel and Non-Ferrous Metals, while it is (more or less) constant in Chemicals, 
Paper and Wood and decreasing in the other sectors. All this points to considerable country 
specific dynamics concerning the use of energy and labour in manufactring production.  
 To see what this implies for delinking economic growth and energy use at the sectoral 
level, we summarize in Figure 5 per country the total percentage change of the level of GDP, 
final energy use and total employment over roughly the period 1970-1997.10  
 
                                         
10 Note that similar to Figure 1 the exact periods differ per country, due to limited data availability. Also for this 
reason Australia and Canada are not included in Figure 5. 
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< Insert Figure 5 around here > 
 
The figure leads to the following observations. First, absolute decoupling of economic growth 
and energy use is concentrated in a number of energy-intensive sectors, such as Iron and Steel 
(Belgium, West Germany and Denmark), Non-Metallic Minerals (Finland, West Germany, 
Italy) and Chemicals (Denmark, Italy); but also in Machinery (Denmark, Norway, Sweden) 
and Transport equipment (Finland, France, Netherlands, United Kingdom, USA). Second, all 
three countries that showed absolute decoupling at the aggregate manufacturing level in 
Figure 1 - Denmark, United Kingdom and the USA - are characterised by a relatively high 
increase in value added of the chemical sector. This might well be due to a pattern of 
specialisation away from the energy-i tensive sub-sector Industrial Chemicals. Third, in these 
countries delinking is due to decreasing energy consumption in a range of sectors, most 
notably Iron and Steel, Non-Metallic Minerals and Transport Equipment; in additio , the 
USA shows a particularly high increase of value added in the large Machinery sector (cf. 
Figure 4). Fourth, the increasing manufacturing energy consumption in Finland (see Figure 1) 
is concentrated in a few energy-i tensive industries: Chemicals, Iron and Steel, Non-Ferrous 
Metals and Paper. Fifth, the large increase in the Italian manufacturing value added (see 
Figure 1) is caused by value-add d growth in a range of sectors, particularly in Chemicals 
and Machinery. Finally, despite considerable cross-country differences in sectoral dynamics, 
a few common patterns can be observed. For example, Iron and Steel and Textiles (except for 
Italy) are declining sectors in most countries, as can be seen from the simultaneous decrease 
of energy, labour and GDP levels. The next section is devoted to a further exploration of the 
impact of such structural changes on energy- and labour productivity growth, in comparison 
with the impact of efficiency improvements at the sectoral level.  
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4. Decomposing productivity growth rates 
As we have argued in section 1, overall productivity performance not only results from 
technology-driven productivity performance in individual sectors, but also from the 
distribution of production factors among sectors. Therefore, in this section we will correct 
trends in aggregate energy- and labour-productivity performance for the impact of shifts in 
sectoral energy- and employment shares, to get a better view on the role of sector-specific 
technology-driven productivity improvements in driving aggregate productivity growth.  
 We do so by using a decomposition- or shift-share analysis, which is based on the 
following definitions of, respectively, aggregate energy productivity and labour productivity: 
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with Yt, Et and Lt being, respectively, GDP, final energy consumption and total employment, 
and the subscript i denoting the sub- ector. So, equation (1) says that aggregate energy 
productivity is the sum of the energy productivity of each sub-sector (the first term at RHS) 
multiplied by the energy share of each sub-sector (the second term at RHS). Equation (2) 
defines the same relationship in terms of labour productivity. Building upon equations (1) and 
(2), we decompose aggregate energy- a d labour-productivity growth into a structural effect 
and an efficiency effect. The structural effect is obtained by calculating aggregate energy- 
and labour-productivity growth insofar as it is caused by shifts in sectoral energy- and 
employment shares (the second term at RHS), keeping the levels of energy- and labour-
productivity performance for each individual sub-sector (the first term at RHS) constant. Vice 
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versa, the efficiency effect is obtained by calculating aggregate energy- and labour-
productivity growth insofar as it is caused by changes in the energy- and labour-productivity 
performance within each individual sub-sector, keeping the sectoral energy- and employment 
shares constant. Hence, the structural effect indicates the effect of changes in the structure of 
production on aggregate productivity growth while the efficiency effect points to the role of 
technology-driven efficiency improvements.  
 Many studies have measured the relative contribution of structural and technological 
change to aggregate productivity growth, using so-called index number decomposition or 
shift-share analysis. The studies differ from each other in several dimensions, including the 
number of sectors and countries i cluded, the methodology (Laspyeres, Paasche, Divisia, 
etc.), the area of application (TFP, capital, labour, energy), the type of indicator (quantity, 
intensity, productivity or elasticity) and the type of analysis (time-series or period-wise). For 
a lucid exposition of the methodology and a survey of studies on (total factor) productivity 
we refer to Syrquin (1984) and Balk (2001), as well as to Ang (1995a, 1995b, 1999) and Ang 
and Zhang (2000) for applications in the context of energy studies.11  
 In this study we have chosen for time-series analysis, the additive technique and the so-
called Refined Divisia Method (RDM). We have chosen to use the RDM because this method 
gives, contrary to the other methods, perfect decomposition irrespective of the pattern 
exhibited by the data and leaving no residual term. Moreover, this method has the advantage 
that it can handle the value zero in the data set effectively, while the other methods cannot. 
We have chosen to use the additive technique because we are interested in decomposing the 
absolute change in energy- and labour productivity, rather than a relative change. The main 
                                         
11 For early applications of this methodology to measure the impact of technological change and changes in 
labour and/or capital shares on aggregate (total factor productivity) growth see, for example, Maddison (1952) 
and Massell (1961). For recent applications, including cross-country comparisons, see Dollar and Wolff (1993), 
van Ark (1996) and Fagerberg (2000). Cross-country decomposition analyses of energy use can be found, for 
example, in Greening et al. (1997), Howarth et al. (1991), Schipper and Meyers (1992), Park et al. (1993), 
Eichhammer and Mannsbart (1997) and Unander et al. (1999).  
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value added of our study lies in a imultaneous exploration of productivity performance along 
the two dimensions of energy and labour for 14 OECD countries over about 25 years. 
Moreover, compared to most other studies our analysis comprises a relatively high level of 
sectoral detail for a relatively large number of countries, in particular in terms of energy-
productivity developments. As a result, the changes in technology-driven productivity 
performance at the level of individual sectors reported here are relatively well specified and 
informative. Furthermore, our data set enables us to apply a time-s ries approach whereas 
most cross-country studies conduct a period-wise approach, using only data for the first and 
the last year of a specified time period. Compared to a period-wise appr ach, a time-series 
approach yields more insight into energy-productivity development over subsequent years 
and, moreover, the decomposition results are less sensitive to the exact functional form used 
and to the values in the initial- and final year.  
 In Figures 6 and 7 we present the results of the decomposition of the aggregate 
manufacturing energy- and labour productivity growth rates into a structural effect and an 
efficiency effect.12 It is to be noted that one has to be careful with comparing the results 
between countries due to the different time periods used (because of data availability). 
 
< Insert Figures 6 and 7 around here > 
 
Figure 6 shows that in all 12 OECD countries energy-effici nc  improvements are the main 
driving force behind aggregate manufacturing energy-productivity growth, although in most 
countries there is also a substantial effect from shifts in sectoral energy shares on aggregate 
manufacturing energy-productivity growth. This structural effect is mixed: it is positive in 
                                         
12 Due to limited data availability, Australia and Canada are excluded from the analysis. Moreov r, for the sam  
reason in France, Japan, United Kingdom and USA the sector Wood and in Denmark the sector Non-Ferrous 
Metals are excluded from the decomposition analysis. 
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Belgium (41%), Denmark (11%), France (47%), West-Germany (20%), Italy (37%), Japan 
(33%) and the USA (35%), indicating a shift towards a less energy-intensive Manufacturing 
structure, while it is negative in Finland (-50%), the Netherlands (-30%), Norway (-960%) 
and Sweden (-12%), indicating a shift towards a more energy-intensive manufacturing 
structure. In Norway the large structural change even dominates the energy- fficiency 
improvements. 
 This overall picture accords well with other cross-country studies decomposing 
manufacturing energy use in OECD countries (Greening et al. 1997; Howarth et al. 1991; 
Eichhammer and Mannsbart 1997; Unander et al. 1999), although our structural effects in 
Finland, France and Italy are relatively high as compared to these studies. This might well be 
due to differences in data, period and decomposition method between the other studies and 
ours.13 Concerning labour-productivity growth, Figure 7 shows that in all 12 OECD countries 
the effect of shifts in sectoral employment shares on aggregate Manufacturing labour-
productivity growth is positive, but also very small; almost all aggregate Manufacturing 
labour-productivity growth is to be explained from labour productivity improvements in 
individual sectors. This result confirms what has been known from empirical labour-
productivity analyses for the Manufacturing sector (see, for example, Dollar and Wolff 1993
and Fagerberg 2000). Finally, except for Denmark and the USA, the average manufacturing 
labour-productivity growth is higher than manufacturing energy-productivity growth. We 
calculated that for the 12 OECD countries taken together the weighted averag  annual growth 
rates of Manufacturing energy- and labour productivity are, respectively, 2.25% and 2.69%, 
                                         
13 The results depend to some extent also on the level of aggregation. As noted in Section 2, he higher the level 
of disaggregation the better, but even more important is an adequate distinction between factor-intensive and 
factor-extensive sectors in order to reduce the likelihood of efficiency-performance figures being biased by the 
impact of intra-sectoral structural changes. However, in a European cross-country decomposition analysis of 
energy-efficiency in the Manufacturing industry, Eichhammer and Mannsbart (1997) concluded that, apart form 
data-related methodological problems, an analysis at a 2-digit level suffices to isolate the main structural effects 
on aggregate productivity developments. After disaggregating several energy-intensive sectors to a 4-digit level, 
they found intra-sectoral structural changes to be responsible for at maximum 10% of the observed aggregate 
energy-intensity changes.  
 16
while they drop to, respectively, 1.57% and 2.53% after being corrected for the impact of 
structural changes. 
 To see which sectors are responsible for these aggregate results, we split the percentage 
contribution of the total efficiency effect and the total structural effect to the aggregate 
productivity growth rates, as presented in Figures 6 and 7 respectively, into the percentage 
contribution of individual sub-sectors. The results are presented in Tables 3 and 4. 
 
< Insert Table 3 around here > 
  
From Table 3 it can be concluded that, except for France, the aggregate manufacturing 
energy-productivity improvements are to a large extent realised within th  Machinery sector, 
followed by Chemicals.14 Looking into the sources of structural changes yields a more 
diverse picture. In Belgium, the substantial positive structural effect on aggregate 
manufacturing energy-productivity growth is mainly caused by a shift of the energy share 
from Machinery, Iron and Steel, Non-Ferrous Metals and Non-Metallic Minerals towards 
Chemicals, Food, Transport Equipment and Paper. The small positive structural effect in 
Denmark is mainly the result of a relatively small increasing energy share in Food and 
Machinery and decreasing energy shares in Textiles, Transport Equipment, Non-Metallic 
Minerals and Iron and Steel, while the role of Non-Ferrous Metals is unclear due to lack of 
data. The substantial negative impact of structural changes on aggregate manufacturing 
                                         
14 Note that in France, Norway and in particular in the Netherlands a substantial part of the efficiency 
improvement is realised within the sector Non-Specified Industry (NSI). The same holds for structural changes 
in Italy, Norway and, again particularly, in the Netherlands. NSI contains rubber (355) and plastic products (not 
classified elsewhere) (356), furniture (332) and professional, scientific, measuring and controlling equipment 
(not classified elsewhere), photographic and optical goods (385). Furthermore, it contains energy consumption 
for which no sectoral breakdown can be given. Whereas NSI is rather unimportant in most countries with an 
average share of 2% of total energy consumpti , in the countries mentioned before the share of NSI in 
Manufacturing GDP is on average about 12%. In sum, one should read the results with caution since an 
efficiency improvement and a changing energy share in NSI is partly due to developments in the ab ve 
mentioned sectors (ISIC 355, 356, 332 and 385) and might be partly due to data inaccuracy. 
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energy-productivity growth in Finland is to a large extent caused by a shift in energy share 
from Machinery, Food, Transport Equipment and Textiles towards Paper, Non-Specified 
Industry, Iron and Steel and Chemicals. In France the positive structural effect is mainly due 
to a shift of energy shares from Textiles, Iron and Steel and Transport Equipment towards 
Machinery, Paper and Food. In West Germany an increasing energy share in Machinery and 
Chemicals at the cost of a decreasing energy share in Iron and Steel, Textiles and Non-
Metallic Minerals mainly causes the positive structural effect. The positive structural effect in 
Italy has been mainly due to a shift of energy shares from Non-Metallic Mi erals and Iron 
and Steel towards Machinery, Non-Specified Industry, Food and Textiles. In Japan the 
structural changes towards a less energy-intensive manufacturing structure were mainly 
driven by a shift towards Machinery and Transport Equipment, while energy shares 
decreased in Textiles, Foods, Iron and Steel and Non-Metallic Minerals. The negative 
structural effect in the Netherlands is the result of a shift in energy shares from Non-Specified 
Industry, Chemicals, Transport Equipment and Paper towards Machinery and Iron a d Steel. 
The major negative structural effect in Norway is mainly driven by a shift in energy shares 
towards Chemicals and Paper at the cost of decreasing energy shares in Machinery, Food, 
Transport Equipment and Non-Metallic Minerals. The negligible impact of structural changes 
in the United Kingdom is mainly due to the fact that a slight increase in energy shares in 
Chemicals, Food and Paper outweighs a slight decrease in energy shares in Non-Met llic 
Minerals, Transport Equipment and Iron and Steel. In the USA a shift in energy share from 
Iron and Steel towards Machinery and Chemicals has been the main driving force behind the 
role of structural changes in improving aggregate Manufacturing energy-productivity 
improvement. 
 These findings confirm that in general a positive effect of total structural change on 
aggregate manufacturing energy-productivity growth is to a large extent driven by a shift in 
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energy shares from low-value added (energy-intensive) sectors  – such as Iron and Steel, 
Non-Ferrous Metals and Non-Metallic Minerals – to higher value added (capital- and/or 
technology-intensive) industries – uch as Machinery, Transport Equipment, Textile and 
Food – while the opposite is true in case of an overall negative structural effect. Our results 
suggest, however, a few exceptions to this picture. For example, Belgium realises an overall 
positive effect of structural changes on aggregate manufacturing energy-productivity rowth 
in spite of a substantial decreasing energy share in the high value added Machinery sector, 
while the same applies for France and Japan with respect to Textiles. Moreover, Belgium, 
West Germany, Japan and the USA, combine an increasing energy share in the energy-
intensive Chemical sector with an overall positive structural effect while the Netherlands 
combine a decreasing energy share in Chemicals with an overall negative structural effect. A 
similar story is true for the Paper sector: Belgium and France combine a substantial increase 
in energy share in the energy-i tensive sector Paper with an overall positive structural effect, 
while the opposite is true for the Netherlands, which realises an overall negative structural 
effect in spite of a shift away from Paper. Of course, these counter-examples can be 
explained from the simple fact that shifts in energy shares in one sector are sufficiently 
compensated by shifts in other sectors. Moreover, they might be due to data limitations, 
partly because in some countries (in particular Italy and the Netherlands) a significant role is 
played by Non-Specified Industry and partly because of the fact that the 2- and 3-digit sector 
definitions that were used hide heterogeneity in production structure at the 4-digi  level.15  
                                         
15 Recall that the Chemicals sector is built up from the energy-int nsive sub-sector Industrial Chemicals (ISIC 
351) and the energy-extensive sub-sector Other Chemical Products (ISIC 352). Similarly, the Paper sector is 
built up from the energy-intensive Paper and Pulp sector (ISIC 341) and the energy-extensive Printing sector 
(ISIC 342. Hence, the observed shifts in energy shares might be characterised as intra-sectoral shifts. For 
example, it is known that in the Netherlands the share of Industrial Chemicals in the Chemical industry has been 
substantially reduced over time (CPB 2000: 63-68). As noted before, until consistent and internationally 
comparable energy and economic data become available for a more detailed breakdown of these sectors, the 
decomposition results should be interpreted with caution. 
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 Finally, In Table 4 we present a similar breakdown of the total structural- and 
efficiency effect as in Table 3, but now for labour productivity.   
 
< Insert Table 4 around here > 
 
Table 4 shows that, as for energy productivity, the aggregate manufacturing labour-
productivity improvements are to a large extent realised within the Machinery sector. 
Moreover, the table shows that, although in all countries there is only a very limited impact of 
structural changes on aggregate Manufacturing labour-productivity growth, this does not 
imply that there were no changes in employment mix. It can be seen that the main structural 
change consisted of a decreasing employment share of the labour-intensive sector Textiles 
(except for Italy) and an increasing employment share of the capital/technology intensive 
sector Machinery (except for Belgium). Moreover, in most countries this shift is accompanied 
by a shift in employment from Iron and Steel towards Chemicals, Food and Paper.   
 
5. Sectoral biases in productivity growth rates 
As a final step in our analysis, in this section we take a closer look at the relation between 
growth rates of energy- and labour productivity. For this aim we calculated for each 
manufacturing sector the average annual growth rates of energy- and labour productivity per 
country for the period 1970-1997. They are presented in Figure 8 together with 2 regression 
lines through the origin, estimating the relationship between energy- and labou-productivity 
growth rates for, respectively, the periods 1970-1982 and 1982-1997.16  
                                         
16 Note that the exact period differs for each country due to data restrictions. We refer to Tables A.2 and A.3 in 
Appendix A for an overview of the periods used per country, the sectoral growth rates per country (the same as 
in Figure 8, but then in tabular format) as well as the eighted average sectoral growth rates for the sum of the 
OECD countries included in this study.  
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< Insert Figure 8 around here > 
 
This leads to the following three conclusions. First, overall a positive correlation exists 
between energy- and labour productivity growth rates, suggesting energy- and labour-
productivity growth to be complements rather than substitutes. There are, however, a few 
exceptions. In several sectors, most notable in Transport Equipment, and Paper and Wood, 
several countries combine a positive labour-productivity growth rate with a negative growth 
rate in energy productivity. Second, labour-productivity growth is in general higher than 
energy-productivity growth, suggesting the existence of a bias towards labour-augmenting 
technological change. Third, over time, this bias towards labour-productivity growth is 
decreasing in all manufacturing sectors except for Paper: in this sector the regression line for 
the period 1982-1997 is steeper than those for the period 1970-1982. This result is in contrast 
with the increasing bias towards labour-productivity growth, which we found at the level of 
aggregate manufacturing and, hence, underlines the relevance of productivity analysis at a 
disaggregated level.  
 The overall positive relationship between energy- and labour-productivity growth rates 
may suggest that technological change is embodied in new capital goods which perform 
better than older capital goods in multiple dimensions, including a better performance in 
terms of both labour- and energy productivity. This hypothesis assumes that knowledge is 
more or less a public good as a result of which the most recent capital goods embody state- f-
the art technology in different dimensions. If this is true, firms and sectors investing in new 
capital goods in order to expand or replace existing production facilities or to increase labour 
productivity, invest at the same time in energy-savi g technological change. However, more 
precise conclusions concerning these issues require a better insight in the nature of 
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technological change through microeconomic research (see, for example, Newell et al. 1999), 
which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
6. Conclusions  
Technological change plays a crucial role in decoupling economic growth and environmental 
pressure. Technology-driven productivity growth is an important source of economic growth 
and plays an important role in realising this decoupling, for example, through increasing 
energy productivity. Against this background, we empirically examined in this paper the 
energy- and labour-productivity performance in 14 OECD over the last decades, covering the 
period 1970-1997 and distinguishing 10 manufacturing sectors. A principal aim of this paper 
was to trace back aggregate manufacturing productivity developments to developments at the 
level of these manufacturing subsectors. 
 At the level of aggregate manufacturing we found that in all OECD countries value 
added has increased while in virtually all countries total manufacturing employment has been 
declining, implying increasing labour productivity. Our data confirm the well-known leading 
position of the USA in terms of labour productivity, while there is no clear pattern of 
catching-up by other OECD countries. With respect to manufacturing final energy 
consumption the picture is diverse, with energy use having increased in some countries while 
it has been falling in others. N vertheless, except for Norway, in all studied OECD countries 
aggregate manufacturing energy productivity has increased over time (due to the relatively 
high growth in value added). Moreover, cr ss-country differences in energy productivity are 
found to be substantially larger than c oss-country differences in labour productivity.  
 Delinking of economic growth and energy use was shown to be relative (‘weak’ 
decoupling) in most OECD countries, while Denmark, the United Kingdom and the USA 
show a pattern of absolute delinking (‘strodecoupling’). These latter three countries were 
 22
found to be characterised by a relatively high increase in value added of the chemical sector 
and by decreasing energy consumption in a range of sectors, most notably Iron and Steel, 
Non-Metallic Minerals and Transport Equipment; in addition, the USA shows a particularly 
high increase of value added in the large Machinery sector. Moreover, at the subsectoral level 
absolute decoupling of economic growth and energy use is mostly concentrated in a number 
of energy-intensive sectors, such as Iron and Steel, Non-M tallic Minerals and Chemicals as 
well as in Machinery and Transport equipment. 
 A decomposition analysis revealed that in most countries structural changes explain a 
substantial part of manufacturing energy-productivity growth rates while they explain only a 
small part of manufacturing labour-prod ctivity growth rates. The positive structural effects 
are to a large extent driven by a shift of energy shares from low-value added (energy-
intensive) sectors (such as Iron and Steel, Non-Ferrous Metals and Non-Metallic Minerals) to 
higher value added (capital- and/or technology-intensive) industries (such as Machinery, 
Transport Equipment, Textile and Food) – while the opposite is true in case of an overall 
negative structural effect. The Machinery sector is the main source for both energy- and 
labour productivity improvements. Finally, although the total structural effect on 
manufacturing labour-productivity growth is small, there have been changes in employment 
mix; the main shifts include a decreasing employment share of the labour-intensive sector 
Textiles (except for Italy) and an increasing employment share of the capital/technology 
intensive sector Machinery (except for Belgium). Furthermore, in most countries thi  shift is 
accompanied by a shift in employment from Iron and Steel towards Chemicals, Food and 
Paper. 
 An exploration of the relationship between energy- and labour-productivity growth 
rates has shown that this relationship, with some exceptions, is posi ve in most sectors, 
suggesting energy- and labour-productivity growth to be complements rather than substitutes. 
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Furthermore, we found labour-productivity growth rates in general to be substantially higher 
than energy-productivity growth while this bias towards labour-productivity growth increased 
in aggregate Manufacturing, but decreased in most manufacturing sectors. The latter result 
underlines the relevance of a sectoral approach in analysing issues concerning factor 
productivity and decoupling of economic growth and energy use.   
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Appendix A 
 
 
Table A.1 Percentage shares of total Manufacturing Energy Consumption (E), Employment (L) and GDP (Y) by sector, in 
1990 
 AUS  BEL  CAN  DNK  FIN  FRA  WGR 
                            
 E L Y  E L Y  E L Y  E L Y  E L Y  E L Y  E L Y 
                            
CHE 17 4 --  35 10 14  -- 4 --  14 5 9  17 5 7  37 7 9  36 7 10 
FOD 12 12 --  6 14 15  -- 12 --  27 17 21  4 12 12  9 13 13  6 9 11 
IAS 12 3 --  27 5 5  -- 2 --  5 1 1  11 3 3  14 4 3  22 5 5 
MAC 2 19 --  3 24 21  -- 20 --  8 34 30  3 26 27  8 29 26  4 37 34 
MTR 1 8 --  2 10 11  -- 11 --  2 5 5  0 6 5  2 12 11  4 11 12 
NFM 33 2 --  3 2 3  -- 2 --  3 0 0  2 1 1  4 1 2  4 2 2 
NMM 12 4 --  12 5 6  -- 3 --  21 4 4  9 5 5  10 3 4  9 4 4 
PAP 7 10 --  3 8 7  -- 15 --  7 10 11  41 18 21  8 8 8  5 5 5 
TEX 2 8 --  2 12 7  -- 9 --  3 7 5  1 8 4  3 10 6  2 6 4 
WOD 1 5 --  0 2 1  -- 5 --  4 3 2  6 8 7  2 2 2  1 2 1 
NSI  0 
---- 
25 
---- 
-- 
---- 
 7 
---- 
8 
---- 
10 
---- 
 -- 
---- 
16 
---- 
-- 
---- 
 4 
---- 
13 
---- 
12 
---- 
 8 
---- 
9 
---- 
9 
---- 
 3 
---- 
11 
---- 
16 
---- 
 7 
---- 
11 
---- 
12 
---- 
MAN 100 100 100  100 100 100  100 100 100  100 100 100  100 100 100  100 100 100  100 100 100 
                            
 ITA   JPN   NLD  NOR  SWE  GBR  USA 
                            
 E L Y  E L Y  E L Y  E L Y  E L Y  E L Y  E L Y 
                            
CHE 34 5 7  31 3 9  67 9 15  27 5 10  15 5 7  32 6 11  -- 6 11 
FOD 5 8 10  4 10 11  8 17 16  6 18 16  4 9 10  10 11 13  -- 9 11 
IAS 14 2 3  20 3 6  8 2 3  19 2 3  9 3 3  12 3 3  -- 2 3 
MAC 7 26 27  6 36 38  3 31 26  3 25 25  6 35 31  10 32 26  -- 27 27 
MTR 1 7 8  2 8 11  1 7 5  1 8 8  2 13 11  3 10 12  -- 10 10 
NFM 2 1 1  3 1 2  3 1 1  23 4 6  3 1 1  3 1 1  -- 1 1 
NMM 18 7 7  9 4 4  5 4 4  4 3 0  5 3 3  9 4 4  -- 3 2 
PAP 5 5 6  8 2 3  3 12 11  14 16 17  44 14 15  5 10 11  -- 12 12 
TEX 5 23 16  3 7 2  1 6 3  0 4 2  1 3 2  3 10 6  -- 10 5 
WOD 0 3 2  -- 3 1  0 2 2  3 6 5  6 6 6  0 2 1  -- 4 3 
NSI  9 
---- 
13 
---- 
13 
---- 
 14 
---- 
22 
---- 
13 
---- 
 0 
---- 
9 
---- 
14 
---- 
 0 
---- 
10 
---- 
7 
---- 
 4 
---- 
8 
---- 
9 
---- 
 12 
---- 
12 
---- 
11 
---- 
 -- 
---- 
15 
---- 
15 
---- 
MAN  100 100 100  100 100 100  100 100 100  100 100 100  100 100 100  100 100 100  100 100 100 
Sum sectors might differ slightly from 100 due to rounding. 
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Table A.2 Manufacturing  sectors Energy Productivity Average Annual Growth Rates 
 AUS BEL CAN DNK FIN FRA WGR ITA JPN  NLD NOR SWE GBR USA  OECD 
                 
 70-97 71-97 70-97 72-97 71-97 73-97 70-90 70-97 82-97 82-97 76-97 73-97 70-97 70-94   
                 
MAN 0.41 1.91 0.45 2.74 1.93 0.85 1.45 3.07 1.71 1.87 -0.08 2.19 2.28 3.19  2.25 
                 
CHE -- 2.4 -1.31 6.17 1.02 2.79 0.53 6.61 0.22 4.04 1.68 3.16 3.08 2.94  2.26 
FOD -- -0.52 -- 1.44 2.13 0.12 0.56 1.47 -1.16 1.63 0.65 1.38 1.62 1.42  0.64 
IAS -- 1.4 -1.09 6.48 3.32 1.93 2.32 0.69 2.47 -2.38 0.97 4.33 2.16 4.48  2.67 
MAC -- 3.09 -- 3.23 5.62 -1.11 0.83 3.05 2.54 0.91 3.33 5.82 1.82 1.86  1.80 
MTR -- -0.80 -- -0.17 4.04 1.01 2.40 -1.37 -0.53 2.14 -1.33 0.09 1.9 2.59  1.35 
NFM -- 3.61 -0.3 -- 1.74 3.72 1.58 1.01 0.72 0.22 0.83 2.17 1.17 1.23  1.31 
NMM -- 1.09 1.39 0.59 3.05 -0.37 1.87 3.74 1.83 1.20 1.30 2.38 3.46 -1.05  1.30 
PAP -- -2.73 -0.54 1.69 1.17 -1.12 -0.05 3.14 0.16 2.66 0.14 1.04 2.08 1.89  1.31 
TEX -- -2.90 -- 3.06 1.23 1.56 -0.16 1.92 1.34 -0.05 1.06 1.07 0.87 2.46  1.59 
WOD -- 0.2 -- 0.14 2.07 -- 1.54 -1.87 -- 1.69 -1.64 -1.70 -- --  -0.01 
The OECD average is weighted with each country’s 1990 GDP share of total GDP per sector. 
 
Table A.3 Manufacturing sectors Labour Productivity Average Annual Growth Rates. 
 AUS BEL CAN DNK FIN FRA WGR ITA JPN  NLD NOR SWE GBR USA  OECD 
                 
 70-97 71-97 70-97 72-97 71-97 73-97 70-90 70-97 82-97 82-97 76-97 73-97 70-97 70-94   
                 
MAN 1.06 4.29 1.79 2.09 4.84 2.92 2.26 3.93 2.98 3.03 1.60 3.19 2.82 2.39  2.69 
                 
CHE -- 3.70 3.74 3.61 3.55 5.12 3.06 7.41 3.16 5.19 5.04 2.16 4.80 4.40  4.22 
FOD -- 2.99 1.34 3.21 3.12 1.99 1.63 3.46 -1.79 2.81 -0.31 2.04 2.67 1.65  1.25 
IAS -- 4.63 1.56 4.83 6.77 2.80 2.44 2.44 3.53 2.82 4.05 6.22 3.44 2.72  3.03 
MAC -- 3.74 1.90 1.70 6.47 2.86 1.85 4.34 6.07 2.81 2.28 4.87 2.61 5.05  4.40 
MTR -- 2.70 2.54 -1.08 5.05 2.23 1.97 2.37 3.19 2.61 1.58 1.53 2.96 1.00  2.02 
NFM -- 7.07 2.95 4.28 4.85 3.70 3.26 5.03 1.68 2.86 2.62 3.89 3.66 1.35  2.41 
NMM -- 4.10 1.43 0.39 4.02 2.58 2.76 4.15 3.21 3.08 1.77 1.08 1.80 1.71  2.71 
PAP -- 3.14 1.00 1.09 4.60 1.66 2.20 4.37 1.02 2.07 1.19 2.22 1.71 0.56  1.27 
TEX -- 4.84 2.73 2.32 4.46 2.47 3.06 3.52 2.38 1.41 3.02 3.00 2.47 3.81  3.28 
WOD -- 5.81 1.98 1.17 4.82 4.10 2.52 3.46 0.31 1.60 2.22 2.60 0.66 0.95  1.53 
The OECD average is weighted with each country’s 1990 GDP share of total GDP per sector. 
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Table 1. Sector Classification 
 
 Sector Abbreviation ISIC Rev. 2 code 
1 Food and Tobacco FOD 31 
2 Textiles and Leather TEX 32 
3 Wood and Wood Products WOD 331* 
4 Paper, Pulp and Printing PAP 34 
5 Chemicals CHE 351+352** 
6 Non-Metallic Minerals NMM 36 
7 Iron and Steel IAS 371 
8 Non-Ferrous Metals NFM 372 
9 Machinery MAC 381+382+383*** 
10 Transport Equipment  MTR 384 
*  WOD excludes furniture since the sector WOD in the IEA Energy Balances excludes furniture 
**      CHE includes non-energetic energy consumption, i.e. using energy carriers as feedstock.  
*** MAC = Metal Products (BMA, 381) +  Agricultural and Industrial Machinery (MAI, 382) +   Electrical Goods (MEL, 383);
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Table 2. Energy- and labour productivity manufacturing sectors relative to OECD average (OECD=100)  
 CHE  FOD  IAS  MAC  MTR 
 Energy Labour  Energy Labour  Energy Labour  Energy Labour  Energy Labour 
 1976 1990 1976 1990  1976 1990 1976 1990  1976 1990 1976 1990  1976 1990 1976 1990  1976 1990 1976 1990 
OECD* 100 100 100 100  100 100 100 100  100 100 100 100  100 100 100 100  100 100 100 100 
BEL  97 149 70 78  116 115 85 97  76 58 46 80  98 118 98 94  153 134 81 106 
CAN 96 64 96 92  171 -- 103 87  121 55 96 76  201 -- 99 86  92 -- 92 93 
DNK 269 434 70 53  40 67 45 61  74 96 31 54  89 116 84 55  76 91 65 54 
FIN 68 88 47 55  49 74 51 65  83 50 39 69  59 94 58 82  131 161 -- 63 
FRA 149 168 63 77  125 120 95 89  169 129 57 63  205 100 102 98  198 193 81 90 
WGR 202 175 84 63  135 162 92 86  163 127 67 65  299 215 111 85  91 111 99 89 
ITA  54 141 32 62  87 168 84 107  165 128 72 96  72 102 83 95  319 335 63 91 
JPN  155 176 132 113  240 226 92 76  155 154 139 137  -- 179 40 91  252 171 66 102 
NLD 48 66 79 89  59 76 70 89  120 70 97 85  -- 100 -- 90  195 106 65 74 
NOR 55 58 47 64  57 54 69 48  38 18 43 55  69 61 81 66  83 69 60 58 
SWE 101 147 73 53  78 90 73 67  77 85 31 48  57 68 65 64  86 96 -- 57 
GBR 166 230 66 73  84 114 68 81  169 130 42 62  64 68 71 65  79 142 51 83 
USA -- -- 113 124  -- -- 125 129  -- -- 115 100  -- -- 123 125  -- -- 135 113 
SD log 0.54a 0.56a 0.36 0.27   0.50b 0.42b 0.27 0.25   0.45a 0.58a 0.48 0.28   0.55c 0.36c 0.30d 0.22d   0.49b 0.41b 0.26e 0.22e 
 NFM  NMM  PAP  TEX  WOD 
 Energy Labour  Energy Labour  Energy Labour  Energy Labour  Energy Labour 
 1976 1990 1976 1990  1976 1990 1976 1990  1976 1990 1976 1990  1976 1990 1976 1990  1976 1990 1976 1990 
OECD* 100 100 100 100  100 100 100 100  100 100 100 100  100 100 100 100  100 100 100 100 
BEL  143 156 126 165  46 97 79 119  265 227 55 84  328 124 82 108  145 145 39 44 
CAN 87 31 171 113  157 138 136 103  54 30 88 85  -- -- 107 91  130 -- 100 86 
DNK -- -- 46 48  93 76 92 70  611 322 74 61  130 112 95 74  129 102 95 56 
FIN 111 77 80 103  68 63 65 86  33 33 47 84  176 145 66 69  41 56 65 77 
FRA 133 125 174 159  222 143 126 137  341 182 82 93  151 170 118 116  -- -- 83 91 
WGR 196 163 117 78  148 139 107 100  290 188 68 76  149 108 107 98  185 217 111 75 
ITA  113 108 99 102  119 136 93 98  229 262 59 103  191 216 115 109  803 756 89 80 
JPN  249 193 227 152  121 135 63 88  -- 185 66 98  85 115 55 46  -- -- 48 52 
NLD 111 51 256 168  115 118 -- 111  360 288 72 93  131 134 108 108  402 300 134 89 
NOR 35 20 137 96  65 88 100 79  83 56 56 62  90 95 62 66  87 62 90 66 
SWE 112 72 92 72  86 96 84 82  37 31 58 71  112 64 105 82  76 67 109 87 
GBR 100 98 67 66  123 128 79 75  290 374 65 82  106 139 91 83  -- -- 88 59 
USA -- -- 140 113  -- -- 118 105  -- -- 126 112  -- -- 99 110  -- -- 124 106 
SD log 0.47f 0.68f 0.47 0.37   0.41a 0.26a 0.23 0.19   0.97g 0.97g 0.24 0.18   0.36b 0.30b 0.24 0.26   0.89g 0.85g 0.34 0.25 
a excluding USA b CAN, USA c CAN, JPN, NLD, USA  d NLD  e FIN, SWE  f DNK, USA gJPN, USA h CAN, FRA, JPN, GBR, USA   
Average OECD is weighted with each country’s 1990 GDP share of total GDP per sector. 
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Table 3. Percentage contribution of structural effect (STR) and efficiency effect (EFF) by sector to 
average annual growth rate (g) of aggregate energy productivity in manufacturing per country 
 BEL  
1971-97 
 DNK 
1972-97 
 FIN 
1971-97 
 FRA 
1971-97 
 WGR 
1970-90 
 ITA  
1970-97 
 STR EFF Total  STR EFF Total  STR EFF Total  STR EFF Total  STR EFF Total  STR EFF Total 
CHE 13.5 14.9 28.5  -2.7 20.7 18.0  1.4 5.2 6.6  8.4 25.3 33.7  12.6 3.4 16.0  -0.8 10.8 10.0 
FOD 15.6 -3.8 11.8  10.9 10.6 21.4  -13.6 13.5 -0.1  17.8 2.2 20.0  0.1 5.0 5.1  4.7 5.5 10.2 
IAS -4.8 4.7 -0.1  -1.3 2.8 1.5  2.1 4.6 6.6  -12.5 9.6 -2.9  -9.1 9.3 0.2  -1.0 1.6 0.6 
MAC -24.4 39.2 14.7  7.3 31.1 38.5  -17.0 88.2 71.2  66.7 -36.4 30.3  16.3 20.0 36.3  9.8 22.5 32.3 
MTR  16.5 -5.4 11.1  -4.8 1.5 -3.3  -11.6 12.0 0.4  -10.9 13.9 3.0  9.6 15.7 25.2  6.4 -3.5 2.9 
NFM -1.7 5.5 3.8  -- -- --  0.6 1.3 1.9  -5.1 7.9 2.8  1.5 2.7 4.2  0.1 0.4 0.5 
NMM -3.6 5.9 2.3  -3.1 1.5 -1.7  -5.3 5.8 0.5  0.3 -2.9 -2.5  -3.2 5.2 2.1  -2.1 8.8 6.7 
PAP 12.6 -6.6 6.0  1.0 5.7 6.7  5.3 9.9 15.2  20.1 -13.1 7.0  4.2 0.0 4.2  3.8 3.8 7.6 
TEX 10.2 -12.4 -2.2  -7.1 6.7 -0.4  -12.4 4.7 -7.7  -37.4 17.5 -19.9  -4.3 -0.8 -5.0  4.7 9.7 14.4 
WOD 1.0 0.2 1.2  3.1 -0.3 2.9  -6.2 7.2 1.0  -- -- --  -1.0 1.6 0.5  1.8 -1.4 0.4 
NSI  5.9 
------ 
17.0 
------ 
22.9 
------ 
 7.8 
------ 
8.6 
------ 
16.4 
------ 
 5.9 
------ 
-1.4 
------ 
4.4 
------ 
 0.1 
------ 
28.4 
------ 
28.5 
------ 
 -6.9 
------ 
18.1 
------ 
11.2 
------ 
 9.8 
------ 
4.5 
------ 
14.4 
------ 
MAN % 40.8 59.2 100.0  11.1 88.9 100.0  -50.8 150.8 100.0  47.6 52.4 100.0  19.8 80.2 100.0  37.2 62.8 100.0 
MAN g  0.78 1.13 1.91  0.30 2.43 2.74  -0.98 2.90 1.93  0.40 0.45 0.85  0.29 1.16 1.45  1.14 1.92 3.07 
                        
 JPN  
1982-97 
 NLD 
1982-97 
 NOR 
1976-97 
 SWE 
1973-97 
 GBR 
1970-97 
 USA 
1970-97 
 STR EFF Total  STR EFF Total  STR EFF Total  STR EFF Total  STR EFF Total  STR EFF Total 
CHE 8.4 1.1 9.4  -3.3 32.9 29.6  106.6 182.1 288.7  1.2 10.6 11.9  6.2 14.3 20.5  8.3 6.6 14.9 
FOD -6.1 -7.5 -13.6  -2.8 15.3 12.5  -342.3 140.9 -201.4  -2.1 7.1 5.0  5.4 10.0 15.4  2.7 5.0 7.7 
IAS -5.5 9.2 3.7  3.5 -3.5 0.0  -45.4 33.9 -11.5  -2.4 6.6 4.2  -3.1 3.4 0.3  -4.4 4.8 0.4 
MAC 45.2 52.6 97.9  17.8 10.4 28.3  -514.5 938.9 424.4  -22.5 80.7 58.2  -2.2 29.0 26.8  27.0 19.3 46.3 
MTR  12.4 -3.2 9.2  -3.4 5.7 2.3  -154.9 -171.6 -326.5  4.0 1.2 5.1  -3.3 13.2 9.9  -1.3 7.9 6.6 
NFM -0.5 0.6 0.1  -0.2 0.2 0.0  13.8 55.6 69.4  -0.1 1.7 1.6  0.0 0.6 0.6  0.1 0.9 1.0 
NMM -2.7 4.0 1.3  1.2 2.5 3.7  -126.6 80.6 -46.0  -5.3 3.4 -1.8  -3.7 5.8 2.1  2.3 -0.7 1.6 
PAP 0.3 0.6 0.9  -3.1 13.8 10.7  90.6 22.7 113.3  3.1 7.1 10.2  2.9 8.6 11.5  3.3 6.2 9.4 
TEX -17.6 6.2 -11.4  -1.5 0.3 -1.2  -117.8 39.0 -78.8  -5.0 0.8 -4.1  -2.7 3.5 0.8  0.7 4.3 5.1 
WOD -- -- --  -0.6 1.5 0.9  63.5 -106.1 -42.6  6.4 -5.1 1.4  -- -- --  -- -- -- 
NSI  -0.6 
------ 
3.0 
------ 
2.4 
------ 
 -37.0 
------ 
50.2 
------ 
13.2 
------ 
 68.9 
------ 
-357.8 
------ 
-288.9 
------ 
 11.0 
------ 
-2.7 
------ 
8.3 
------ 
 1.4 
------ 
10.6 
------ 
12.1 
------ 
 -3.9 
------ 
10.9 
------ 
7.0 
------ 
MAN % 33.3 66.7 100.0  -29.5 129.5 100.0  -958.1 858.1 -100.0  -11.6 111.6 100.0  1.0 99.0 100.0  34.8 65.2 100.0 
MAN g  0.57 1.14 1.71  -0.55 2.42 1.87  -0.74 0.67 -0.08  -0.25 2.44 2.19  0.02 2.26 2.28  1.11 2.08 3.19 
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Table 4. Percentage contribution of structural effect (STR) and efficiency effect (EFF) by sector to 
average annual growth rate (g) of aggregate labour productivity in manufacturing per country 
 BEL  
1971-97 
 DNK 
1972-97 
 FIN 
1971-97 
 FRA 
1971-97 
 WGR 
1970-90 
 ITA  
1970-97 
 STR EFF Total  STR EFF Total  STR EFF Total  STR EFF Total  STR EFF Total  STR EFF Total 
CHE 7.8 13.2 20.9  6.4 14.3 20.7  2.0 4.1 6.1  2.1 13.7 15.8  1.8 11.6 13.4  -0.6 9.6 9.1 
FOD 3.0 11.5 14.5  -5.3 27.9 22.6  -0.9 7.9 7.1  5.8 9.7 15.5  -1.3 8.7 7.4  0.1 10.4 10.5 
IAS -3.5 6.3 2.8  -0.7 2.3 1.6  0.5 3.9 4.5  -1.6 3.5 1.9  -4.2 6.5 2.3  -1.5 3.1 1.6 
MAC -0.2 17.9 17.7  16.3 24.3 40.7  11.4 35.1 46.5  2.1 25.3 27.4  7.9 27.6 35.5  2.7 28.2 30.9 
MTR  4.0 6.3 10.3  -3.3 -2.6 -5.9  -2.2 5.5 3.2  0.1 9.0 9.1  11.7 8.2 19.9  -0.9 4.9 4.0 
NFM -1.2 4.2 3.0  -- -- --  0.3 1.2 1.5  -0.3 2.4 2.1  0.9 2.5 3.4  -0.7 1.3 0.7 
NMM -1.2 5.5 4.3  -5.3 1.3 -4.0  -0.7 3.3 2.5  -1.4 3.8 2.3  -2.4 5.2 2.8  -0.6 7.3 6.7 
PAP 1.4 5.0 6.5  -1.6 6.6 5.0  -2.3 20.0 17.7  3.1 4.2 7.3  0.0 4.4 4.4  0.7 6.6 7.2 
TEX -5.8 9.6 3.7  -8.8 6.8 -2.0  -4.6 4.2 -0.4  -6.8 6.0 -0.9  -8.3 6.9 -1.4  -0.1 15.0 15.0 
WOD 0.1 0.9 0.9  1.1 1.7 2.7  -1.9 6.6 4.7  0.0 0.0 0.0  -0.8 1.7 0.9  -1.2 2.0 0.9 
NSI  3.2 
------ 
12.0 
------ 
15.3 
------ 
 5.8 
------ 
12.9 
------ 
18.7 
------ 
 5.0 
------ 
1.7 
------ 
6.7 
------ 
 3.0 
------ 
16.4 
------ 
19.4 
------ 
 4.2 
------ 
7.4 
------ 
11.6 
------ 
 1.6 
------ 
11.8 
------ 
13.4 
------ 
MAN % 7.6 92.4 100.0  4.6 95.4 100.0  6.6 93.4 100.0  6.0 94.0 100.0  9.2 90.8 100.0  -0.3 100.3 100.0 
MAN g  0.33 3.96 4.29  0.10 2.00 2.09  0.32 4.52 4.84  0.18 2.74 2.92  0.21 2.05 2.26  -0.01 3.94 3.93 
                        
 JPN  
1982-97 
 NLD 
1982-97 
 NOR 
1976-97 
 SWE 
1973-97 
 GBR 
1970-97 
 USA 
1970-97 
 STR EFF Total  STR EFF Total  STR EFF Total  STR EFF Total  STR EFF Total  STR EFF Total 
CHE 0.3 8.8 9.2  -1.8 25.9 24.1  0.2 20.9 21.0  4.6 6.0 10.6  0.4 18.3 18.7  1.0 15.9 16.8 
FOD 4.5 -7.1 -2.7  -2.0 16.5 14.6  10.9 -3.3 7.6  -0.3 6.8 6.5  1.2 13.9 15.1  -0.4 7.1 6.7 
IAS -2.8 7.7 4.9  -1.5 2.6 1.1  -4.3 6.7 2.4  -2.5 6.6 4.0  -3.2 4.1 1.0  -4.5 3.8 -0.7 
MAC 4.0 66.7 70.6  2.8 24.7 27.5  10.0 35.5 45.5  4.5 45.4 49.8  2.1 24.8 26.9  0.8 52.2 53.0 
MTR  -0.7 10.1 9.4  -1.0 4.4 3.5  -12.9 8.1 -4.8  1.2 6.2 7.4  -2.6 13.0 10.3  1.4 4.0 5.4 
NFM -0.2 1.1 0.9  -0.7 1.1 0.5  -0.7 9.4 8.6  -0.4 1.9 1.6  -0.8 1.4 0.7  -0.3 1.0 0.7 
NMM -1.6 3.9 2.3  0.2 3.5 3.6  -2.1 4.2 2.0  -1.3 0.9 -0.4  0.0 2.4 2.4  -0.6 1.9 1.2 
PAP 1.2 2.5 3.6  3.4 7.5 10.9  10.8 11.0 21.8  0.9 10.6 11.5  5.2 6.2 11.4  6.4 2.4 8.8 
TEX -8.3 3.7 -4.6  -1.0 1.4 0.4  -5.8 4.5 -1.2  -4.1 2.2 -1.9  -4.2 6.1 1.9  -3.0 8.0 5.0 
WOD 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.4 0.7 1.1  -3.6 6.9 3.4  -1.9 4.8 2.8  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 
NSI  2.5 
------ 
3.8 
------ 
6.4 
------ 
 0.7 
------ 
12.2 
------ 
12.8 
------ 
 2.3 
------ 
-8.6 
------ 
-6.3 
------ 
 2.8 
------ 
5.3 
------ 
8.1 
------ 
 5.9 
------ 
5.9 
------ 
11.7 
------ 
 5.1 
------ 
-2.0 
------ 
3.1 
------ 
MAN % -1.2 101.2 100.0  -0.5 100.5 100.0  4.7 95.3 100.0  3.4 96.6 100.0  4.0 96.0 100.0  5.8 94.2 100.0 
MAN g  -0.04 3.94 2.98  -0.01 3.04 3.03  0.08 1.52 1.60  0.11 3.08 3.19  0.11 2.70 2.82  0.14 2.25 2.39 
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Figure 1. Evidence of Decoupling: Development of Manufacturi g GDP, final energy consumption and 
total employment per country. (Index, initial year with data available =100)  
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Figure 2. Trends in manufacturing energy productivity development  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Trends in manufacturing labour productivity development  
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Figure 4. Percentage shares of manufacturing final energy consumption, total employment and value 
added by sector in 1990. Sample of 12 OECD countries.  
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Figure 5. Decoupling at the sector level: Total percentage change of sectoral GDP, final energy 
consumption and total employment per country. (Index, initial year with data available =100)  
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Figure 6. Decomposition of average annual growth rate of macroeconomic energy productivity 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Decomposition of average annual growth rate of macroeconomic labour productivity 
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Figure 8. Energy- and labour productivity main sectors. Average annual growth rates 
 
C H E
S W E
G B R
U S A
W G R
N O R
ITA
BEL
F R A
FINC A N JPN
N L D
D N K
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
-3 -2 -1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Energy Product iv i ty
LabourProductivity 1982-971970-82
45º
F O D
D N K
N L D
J P N
F IN
F R A
B E L
ITA
N O R
W G R U S A
G B R
SW E
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
-3 -2 -1 1 2 3 4 5 6
Energy Product iv i ty
LabourProduct iv i ty 1970-8 2 1982-9 7
45º
IAS
SW E
G B R
U S AW G R
N O R
ITA
B E L
F R A
F IN
C A N
J P NN L D
D N K
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
-3 -2 -1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Energy Product iv i ty
Labour Product iv i ty
1982-97
1970-82
45º
M A C
S W E
G B R
U S A
W G R
N O R
ITA
B E L
F R A
FINJ P N
N L D
D N K
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
-3 -2 -1 1 2 3 4 5 6
Energy Product iv i ty
Labour Product iv i ty 1982-971970-82
45º
M T R
S W E
G B R
U S A
W G R
N O R
ITA B E L F R A
F IN
J P N
N L D
D N K
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Energy Product iv i ty
Labour  Product iv i ty
1970-8 2 1982-9 7
4 5º
N F M
S W EG B R
U S A
W G R
N O R
ITA
BEL
F R A
FIN
C A N
JPN
N L D
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
-3 -2 -1 1 2 3 4 5 6
Energy Product ivity
Labour Productivity 1970-82 1982-97
45º
N M M
S W E
G B RU S A
W G R
N O R
ITAB E L
F R A
F IN
C A N
J P NN L D
D N K
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
-3 -2 -1 1 2 3 4 5 6
Energy Product iv i ty
Labour  Product iv i ty
1982-9 71970-8 2
45º
P A P
S W E
G B R
U S A
W G R
N O R
ITA
B E L
F R A
FIN
C A N J P N
N L D
D N K
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
-3 -2 -1 1 2 3 4 5 6
Energy Product iv i ty
Labour  Product iv i ty 1970-821982-97
45º
T E X
S W E
G B R
U S A
W G R
N O R
ITA
B E L
F R A
F IN
J P N
N L D
D N K
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
-3 -2 -1 1 2 3 4 5 6
Energy Product iv i ty
Labour  Product iv i ty 1982-9 7
1970-8 2
45º
W O D
S W E W G R
N O R
ITA
BEL
FIN
N L D
D N K
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
-3 -2 -1 1 2 3 4 5 6
Energy Product iv i ty
Labour Product iv i ty
1970-82 1982-97
45º
